A brief note on 'conspiracy theories' and 'conspiracy theorists'

For a few decades it has been popular among people who consider themselves intelligent centrists to use the terms ‘conspiracy theory’ and ‘conspiracy theorist’ as pejorative put-downs. Intuitively, however, this seems quite ridiculous because in reality conspiracies are widespread in all domains of society, from the family level where people conspire to cheat relatives out of inheritance money to the national level where one government uses its covert agencies to overthrow another government (militarily or in a ‘silent coup’).

What most people who use this rhetorical strategy are unaware of, is that the intuition that ‘ordinary people’ have is backed up by a substantial literature in philosophy.¹ A range of philosophers have pointed out that it is incoherent and/or undesirable to use the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in an inherently pejorative way. There are logical, rational and well-founded ‘conspiracy theories’ and there are illogical, irrational and baseless ‘conspiracy theories’. So when we discuss conspiracies we should rather be focused on the merits of the theories, reasoning and available evidence, rather than disparaging the notion that a conspiracy could exist at all.

A lot of my writing here involves exposing dynamics that are concealed from the general public, whether in South Africa, the United States or globally. Sometimes that is the result of a deliberate conspiracy among powerful elites — something that has been happening throughout human history. Other times it is due to a more organic coalescing of vested interests backed up by power and influence. One could call those ‘conspiracy theories’ and in many instances I would not have a problem with that provided it is used as a descriptive term rather than an inherently pejorative one.

The US economist JK Galbraith coined the term ‘the conventional wisdom’ to refer to beliefs that are really a consequence or construct of powerful interests. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman famously described how mass media engage in ‘manufacturing consent’. When those outside the various cliques of power put forward explanations for what is really going on — not what the conventional wisdom or manufactured consent concludes — the term ‘conspiracy theory’ or ‘conspiracy theorist’ has been a useful way of smearing that alternative analysis even (or especially) when it is correct.²

What has also become apparent is that conspiracy theorising is entirely acceptable when it involves certain people or certain issues. For example, it is remarkable how many people who generally disparage ‘conspiracy theories’ believe the attempted assassination of Donald Trump was fake — despite live footage from multiple angles and at least two dead individuals (the assassin and a member of the crowd). The same people believe that there really was a serious conspiracy to overthrow the US government on 6 January 2020³ and that Trump was (is) controlled by Vladimir Putin due to Russian ‘kompromat’.

In fact, many such people will believe almost any conspiracy about Russia or China provided it is peddled by ‘mainstream’ media outlets — so that even when an apparent weather balloon blows off course it is the subject of ‘spy balloon’ hysteria for weeks. (Interestingly, the spy balloon hysteria has just been revived shortly after Trump took office). But they will deny even the possibility of conspiracies by, for example, the Obama administration funding ‘soft coup’ attempts in uncooperative countries — even in the face of significant evidence.

I am open to the possibility that the Trump assassination was staged, but based on the available evidence it seems much more likely to have been real. Moreover, it seems that if there was a deeper conspiracy than merely the motives of the individual in question, it would more likely be on the side of those facilitating the assassination attempt. Almost all experts interviewed on the subject agree that the security failings on the day were extreme and unprecedented. But that is a sensible discussion one can have. The point here is that beyond being logically and intellectually incoherent, the use of ‘conspiracy theory’ as an insult or disparagement is also highly politicised.

In short: it is best not to waste time on the disingenuous rhetorical strategy in which people disparage analyses they don’t like as ‘conspiracy theories’ or people they don’t agree with as ‘conspiracy theorists’. There are many true conspiracy theories and many knowledgeable conspiracy theorists. Any intelligent person must be a conspiracy theorist — or as philosopher Charles Pigden says, “if you are not a conspiracy theorist then you are an idiot”.

Ultimately, what we need to do is try and establish the truth as best we can in an environment where those with power often have strong incentives to conceal it.

1. One of my main areas of academic work these days is philosophy of science and this is a topic I hope to publish on in future.

2. Charles Pigden frames the standard rhetoric around conspiracy theories itself as a form of ‘conventional wisdom’ (here).

3. There clearly was some conspiring among small far-right groups to cause trouble, but there is no evidence of a genuine attempt or intention to overthrow the state.